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Abstract.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	characterization	(2015)	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	context	of	science.		We	argue	that	the	presence	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	severe	non-epistemic	consequences	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	conditions	for	EDD	to	obtain.		We	clarify	their	role	by	arguing	that	they	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	not	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	difference-makers	are	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	and	effective	public	dissemination.		
	
	
Introduction.		The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	characterization	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	context	of	science	(2015).		We	follow	their	lead	in	taking	‘dissent’	to	be	a	particular	kind	of	criticism,	i.e.	the	act	of	objecting	to	a	widely	held	conclusion.		When	done	properly,	dissent	is	welcome	within	scientific	practice.		As	Helen	Longino	has	clearly	established,	“scientific	knowledge	is	produced	collectively	through	the	clashing	and	
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meshing	of	a	variety	of	points	of	view	(1990,	69).		Criticism,	when	done	properly,	is	integral	to	the	collective	advancement	of	science.1		Dissent,	when	an	instance	of	proper	criticism,	is	thus	epistemically	valuable	in	the	context	of	science.			Now	there	are	some	instances	of	dissent	that	come	out	as	epistemically	detrimental.		That	is	to	say,	some	instances	of	dissent	seem	to	impede,	not	promote,	the	collective	advancement	of	science.		Many	examples	come	to	mind,	that	have	been	well	described	in	the	recent	literature	(Oreskes	and	Conway	2010,	Biddle	and	Leushner	2015,	Harker	2015).		Roughly	speaking,	EDD	is	about	manufacturing	controversy	in	a	particular	scientific	field.		The	typical	story	goes	something	like	the	following.		The	research	involved	has	some	severe	non-epistemic	consequences	in	terms	of,	on	one	side,	industry	profit,	and,	on	the	other	side,	public	welfare;	large	amounts	of	money	are	invested	by	industry-related	groups	to	(1)	produce	some	skewed	research,	(2)	largely	publicize	the	results	through	the	media,	(3)	produce	an	atmosphere	of	confusion	and	doubt	within	the	public,	(4)	launch	some	campaign	against	the	lead	scientists	of	the	field	in	the	media	and	political	world	(often	through	personal	attacks	and	threats);	this	results	in	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	scientists	subjectively	feel	a	lot	of	pressure	and	discomfort,	and	also	objectively	waste	precious	time	and	limited	resources	to	address	the	well-publicized	skewed	research.		At	this	point,	the	collective	advancement	of	science	is	clearly	impeded.		We	have	an	instance	of	EDD.		
																																																								1	Longino	(1990)	offers	an	account	of	some	of	the	various	kinds	of	epistemically	beneficial	criticism	within	science.		
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The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	properly	distinguish,	in	that	story,	between	(1)	contingent	enabling	factors,	and	(2)	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Our	most	contentious	claim	is	that	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	presence	of	severe	non-epistemic	risks	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	not	stable	difference-makers	for	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	difference-makers	are	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	and	effective	public	dissemination.		In	Section	1,	we	offer	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	straightforward	argument	for	the	claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	in	the	production	of	EDD:	it	may	lead	to	EDD	only	if	it	leads	to	skewed	science.		In	Section	2	we	argue	that	it	is	not	necessary	either.		Section	3	is	devoted	to	a	clarification	of	the	role	of	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	in	EDD	on	the	basis	of	a	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers.		Section	4	investigates	the	consequences	of	our	analysis	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	proposed	by	Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).		
Section	1.	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	sufficient	for	EDD	That	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	to	the	production	of	EDD	has	been	discussed	by	Wilholt	(2009),	and	Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).		Roughly,	the	point	is	simply	that,	unless	intrusion	of	background	non-epistemic	agendas	is	such	that	the	work	produced	fails	to	satisfy	some	of	the	conventional	standards	for	
proper	science,	there	is	no	problem.	We	offer	here	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	straightforward	argument	for	this	point.			
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As	the	community	of	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	come	to	recognize,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	is	quite	common	(Douglas	2009).		Now	obviously,	that	does	not	necessarily	result	in	skewed	science.		If	a	scientist	defends	a	conclusion	C	on	the	basis	of	evidence	E,	the	fact	that	some	background	non-epistemic	values	enters	in	her	reasoning	does	not	matter	if	(1)	she	can	publicly	produce	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	C,	and	if	(2)	that	reasoning	can	be	assessed	as	adequate	scientific	reasoning	by	her	peers,	including	peers	who	do	not	share	the	same	background	non-epistemic	values.		If	these	two	conditions	are	met,	then	the	conventional	standards	for	proper	science	are	met,	and	we	do	not	have	a	case	of	skewed	science.		Now	if	proper	scientific	work	was	produced,	there	is	no	a	priori	reason	to	think	that	her	work	cannot	partake	in	the	collective	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge.		It	might	do	so	at	various	degrees,	but	that	will	depend	on	its	heuristic	value,	which	is	a	priori	unrelated	to	whether	or	not	there	was	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values.		Let	us	push	this	line	of	argument	a	little	further.		It	is	important	here	to	underline	the	fact	that	the	reasoning	rendered	public	by	the	scientist	might	not	be	the	actual	reasoning	through	which	she	came	to	accept	either	E	or	its	relevance	with	regard	to	C.		From	a	subjective	point	of	view,	for	example,	she	might	well	have	had	accepted	C	well	before	she	produced	E	and	the	reasoning	defending	the	relevance	of	E	as	supporting	C.		She	might	well	have	accepted	C	for	non-epistemic,	value-laden,	reasons.		However,	such	considerations	over	the	subjective	state	of	scientists	do	not	matter.		The	collective	assessment	of	scientific	research	is	not	in	the	business	of	mind	reading.		No	matter	what	kind	of	reasoning	(or	non-reasoning)	actually	
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brought	a	scientist	to	believe	C,	the	relevant	question	is	whether	she	is	capable	of	producing	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	E	and	its	relevance	with	regard	to	C	that	can	be	publicly,	and	positively,	assessed	by	the	experts	in	her	field.		To	put	it	bluntly:	the	most	biased	and	ill-intentioned	scientists	are	a	priori	capable	of	producing	good	scientific	work.2			This	line	of	argument	applies	to	the	production	of	dissenting	views.	Dissenting	claims	proposed	by	scientists	motivated	by	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	necessarily	lead	to	skewed	science	and	hence	to	of	EDD.		If	a	reasoning	can	be	publicly	produced,	and	if	the	members	of	the	scientific	community,	including	members	of	that	community	who	do	not	share	the	same	values	as	the	dissenting	views’	proponents,	assess	that	reasoning	as	scientifically	adequate,	then	we	do	not	have	an	instance	of	skewed	dissent.		As	an	instance	of	work	that	satisfies	the	agreed-upon	standards	of	proper	scientific	practice,	the	dissenting	view	could	well	participate	in	the	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge.		It	could	do	so	at	various	degrees,	depending	on	how	important	the	dissenting	views	are,	but	that	would	not	depend	on	whether	or	not	the	dissenting	views	are	the	product	of	scientists	with	non-epistemic	agendas.		Considerations	about	the	subjective	intentions,	or	background	beliefs,	of	the	scientists	are	irrelevant,	unless	one	can	show	that	skewed	science	was	produced.																																																										2	This	is	not	denying	the	actuality	of	implicit	bias.		By	definition,	implicit	bias	is	still	bias.		As	such,	it	can	be	recognized	by	the	scientific	community	for	what	it	is.		What	is	implicit	about	it	is	that	the	biased	author	(and	possibly	some	of	her	peers	as	well)	is	not	even	realizing	her	own	bias.			
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Section	2	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	necessary	for	EDD	At	this	point,	we	have	shown	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	necessarily	result	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Note	that	EDD	does	not	require	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	either.		What	would	it	take	to	have	a	case	of	EDD	without	any	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas?		We	know	that	EDD	is	about	manufacturing	controversy	within	a	scientific	field.		First,	the	controversy	is	“manufactured”,	not	genuine,	because	the	dissenting	view	is	not	based	on	proper	science;	it	violates	some	of	the	commonly	accepted	standards	for	proper	scientific	practice;	it	is	an	instance	of	skewed	science.		Now	skewed	science	can	come	to	be	in	many	ways.		It	does	not	have	to	result	from	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		One	can	imagine	the	case	of	a	scientist,	say	Jack,	who	is	genuinely	interested	in	partaking	in	the	collective	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	is	also	a	poor	scientist.		One	can	imagine	that	Jack	is	very	wealthy,	and	thus	has	both	the	time	and	financial	resources	to	pursue	his	research,	and	produce	a	large	amount	of	work	challenging	the	commonly	held	views	in	a	given	scientific	field.		Jack,	albeit	misguided	in	many	ways,	could	conceivably	do	all	of	this	with	the	“purest”	goal	in	mind.	Now	one	immediately	sees	that	the	production	of	bad	science	is	not	enough	to	produce	EDD.		Jack’s	research	is	likely	to	be	simply	ignored	by	the	scientific	community.		So	what	would	it	take	to	“manufacture”	a	controversy	on	the	basis	of	Jack’s	research?		The	answer	seems	rather	straightforward:	Jack’s	research	needs	to	be	effectively	disseminated,	so	that	scientists	feel	pressured	to	respond	to	Jack’s	
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challenges.		The	standard	avenues	for	dissemination	of	scientific	research,	i.e.	peer-reviewed	publication,	however,	are	not	likely	to	be	an	option	for	Jack,	since	his	work	is	widely	recognized	by	the	community	as	being	of	poor	scientific	quality.		He	must	then	bypass	these	avenues,	and	manage	to	effectively	disseminate	his	research	among	the	public.		Mass	media	would	be	a	likely	option	for	this.		This	in	turn	forces	scientists	in	the	field	to	waste	time	and	resources	to	address	Jack’s	research.		Hence	a	case	of	EDD,	with	the	purest	epistemic	goal	at	its	source.		The	case	above	might	seem	far-fetched.		One	objection	could	be	that,	unless	some	non-epistemic	values	were	at	stake,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	media	and	the	public	would	get	interested	in	Jack’s	research,	and	Jack	would	fail	to	be	able	to	manufacture	the	controversy.		It	might	be	unlikely,	but	it	is	surely	conceivable.		If	Jack’s	public	dissemination	machinery	is	effective	enough,	(mis-)	understandings	over	the	state	of	research	in	the	field	of	concern	could	well	have	serious	repercussions	on	public	funding.		Jack	could	well	have	a	very	strong	network	of	communication	–	he	could	well	be	the	owner	of	a	very	large	cable	and	press	network.		Repeated	reporting	on	public	funding	of	supposedly	controversial	science	could	well	spur	outrage	in	the	public.		“Debates”	on	mass	media	would	ensue.		As	soon	as	the	scientists	would	engage	in	that	conversation,	Jack’s	claims	would	gain	in	credibility.3		At	the	end,	Jack’s	campaign	could	well	be	so	effective	that	scientists	
																																																								3	This	is	a	point	that	Hannah	Arendt	made	clear	in	her	insightful	analysis	of	controversy-	and	doubt-manufacturing	in	a	completely	different	context,	i.e.	the	(non-)issue	of	the	reality	of	the	Holocaust	during	WWII	(1966/2010).	
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would	indeed	be	forced	to	repeatedly	address	his	research	to	defend	their	own.		So,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	necessary	to	the	production	of	EDD.		
	
Section	3.	Stable	Difference-Makers	v.	Contingent	Enabling	Factor	From	the	discussion	above,	we	conclude	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD.		Such	a	conclusion	might	strike	many	as	unsatisfactory,	however.		Isn’t	it	the	case	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	was	an	important	factor	in	the	production	of	the	common	cases	of	EDD	that	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	50	years?		Some	may	even	want	to	claim	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	in	all	of	the	cases	we	know	of	in	recent	history,	no	EDD	would	have	occurred	if	it	were	not	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		This	is	an	important	intuition,	and	arguably,	any	satisfactory	account	of	EDD	ought	to	make	sense	of	it.		Fortunately,	we	believe	there	is	a	way	to	do	so,	that	is,	by	appealing	to	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	as	discussed	by	Thomson	(2003)	and	Woodward	(2010).		Thomson	(2003)	makes	the	point	(contra	many	theories	of	causation)	that	just	because	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’,	it	does	not	follow	that	‘C	has	caused	E’.		She	argues	that	the	proposition	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’	only	entails	that	‘C	was	physically	necessary	for	E’.		Consider	her	example.		John	built	a	bridge	over	the	Rapid	River.		The	Rapid	River	is	notoriously	wild,	and	only	John,	a	master-builder,	could	have	done	it.		From	the	bridge	being	built,	it	ensues	that	Smith	crosses	the	river.		Now	John’s	building	the	bridge	was	physically	necessary	to	Smith’s	crossing	the	Rapid	River,	but	most	would	agree	that	it	is	misguided	to	take	it	
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as	a	cause	for	it.		John’s	building	the	bridge,	even	if	“physically	necessary”	in	the	whole	process,	remains	largely	irrelevant	to	Smith’s	crossing	the	river.		It	belongs	to	the	background	conditions,	or	environmental	conditions,	that	make	Smith’s	crossing	possible,	without	causing	it	in	any	genuine	sense	of	causation.		In	Thomson’s	vocabulary,	it	is	only	an	enabling	factor.	Woodward	(2010)	is	interested	in	analyzing	a	similar	distinction	between	the	core	difference-makers	and	the	background	conditions.		His	analysis	is	useful	to	flesh	out	some	of	the	characteristics	of	enabling	factors	à	la	Thomson.4		One	of	intuitions	Woodward	is	trying	to	capture	is	that	some	causal	relationships	are	robust,	i.e.	insensitive	to	environmental	change,	while	others	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	a	specific	environment.		To	do	so,	he	articulates	the	notions	of	“stability”.5		A	causal	relationship,	according	to	Woodward,	is	stable	if	and	only	if	it	holds	over	a	wide	range	of	background	conditions.		Some	examples	might	be	useful	at	this	point.		
																																																								4	Note	that	we	do	not	claim	(and	neither	does	Woodward)	to	have	unveiled	the	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	factors	to	qualify	as	enabling	factors	by	contrast	to	stable	difference-makers.		We	will	only	claim	that	being	enabling	factors	are	typically	unstable,	and	hence,	that	lack	of	stability	serves	as	a	good	indicator	for	a	factor	to	be	only	enabling,	not	causing.	
5	Two	other	notions	are	articulated	in	the	article.		The	notion	of	proportionality	serves	to	address	the	issue	of	the	proper	levels	of	explanation.		The	notion	of	specificity	serves	to	address	the	issue	of	coarse	v.	fine-grain	causal	influence.		
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A	paradigmatic	example	of	an	unstable	relation	would	be	the	following.6		“Star”	professor	P	writes	a	letter	of	recommendation	for	Jane,	thanks	to	which	Jane	gets	a	job	at	university	U.		She	would	not	have	gotten	the	job	without	it.		Jane	meets	Joe	at	U,	they	get	married,	and	have	children.		Challenged	by	the	difficulties	of	coupling	an	academic	career	with	quality	parenting,	Jane	goes	into	depression.		Now	consider	the	following	claim:	‘P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	caused	Jane's	depression’.		Given	the	story	that	is	given,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	enabled	Jane's	suffering	from	depression,	but	there	is	also	a	strong	sense	in	which	it	is	misguided	to	take	it	as	a	cause	for	it.		The	reason	is	that	the	relation	between	P’s	writing	the	letter	and	Jane’s	suffering	from	the	disease	would	cease	to	hold	under	many	small,	contingent,	changes	in	the	background	conditions	for	the	story	(Jane	and	Joe	could	not	have	met,	they	could	have	decided	to	not	have	children,	U	could	have	had	a	very	progressive	parental	leave	policy,	etc.).		The	causal	relationship	between	the	letter	and	the	depression	is	thus	highly	unstable	because	it	holds	only	in	a	very	specific	environment.	Now	contrast	this	with	a	paradigmatic	example	of	a	stable	relation.		I	turn	on	the	heat	under	my	closed	pressure	cooker	(with	some	water	in	it).		The	pressure	goes	up	and	the	valve	shuts	down.		Clearly,	heating	up	the	pressure	cooker	is	a	stable	cause	of	the	pressure	valve	to	shut	down.		Many	of	the	most	stable	causal	relations	are	backed	up	by	what	the	kind	of	generalizations	that	we	take	to	be	the	laws	of	physics,	or	chemistry.		These	generalizations	hold	over	a	wide	range	of	background	conditions.																																																									6	This	example	is	inspired	by	Woodward	(2010)	himself	inspired	by	Lewis	(1986).	
	 11	
There	are	obviously	various	degrees	of	stability	in	between	these	two	extreme	cases.		Stability	is	not	an	all	or	nothing	affair.		It	might	also	be	difficult	to	figure	out	which	causal	relationships	are	more	or	less	stable.		That	said,	it	could	also	be	worth	the	effort	looking	into	it,	because,	how	stable	a	factor	is	could	be	a	measure	of	how	well	we	can	target	change	by	targeting	that	factor	in	a	given	situation.		As	Woodward	explains	(2010,	315):	“other	things	being	equal,	causal	relationships	that	are	more	stable	are	likely	to	be	more	useful	for	many	purposes	associated	with	manipulation	and	control	than	less	stable	relationships.”		Applied	to	our	case,	if	ultimately	we	hope	to	be	able	to	alter	the	manufacturing	of	controversy	and	EDD,	it	could	turn	out	to	be	very	useful	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	behind	EDD	by	distinguishing	between	the	contingent	enabling	factors	and	the	more	stable	difference-makers.			Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	analyses	are	clearly	related.		Thomson’s	bridge	example	is	a	clear	case	of	a	very	unstable	causal	relationship:	it	holds	only	under	very	specific	background	conditions	(The	Rapid	River	could	have	been	gently,	Smith	could	have	decided	not	to	cross	the	bridge,	etc.)	Some	unstable	causal	relationships	as	discussed	by	Woodward	are	so	at	least	partially	because	they	are	relationships	of	contingent	“physical	necessity”	à	la	Thomson.		So,	a	causal	factor	may	be	highly	unstable,	despite	being	‘necessary’	to	the	causal	process,	if	its	influence	on	the	process	is	highly	contingent	on	a	specific	environment.		No	matter	how	“necessary”	
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in	that	sense	a	factor	F	is,	F	being	unstable	points	F	being	a	enabling	factor,	not	a	stable	difference-maker.7		The	discussion	above	allows	us	to	bring	home	two	important	points.		First,	it	allows	us	to	identify	two	stable	difference-makers	for	the	production	of	EDD:	the	production	of	skewed	scientific	research	and	its	effective	public	dissemination.		That	the	combination	of	these	two	factors	produces	an	instance	EDD	holds	over	a	wide	range	of	conditions.		What	changes	in	background	conditions	would	make	that	causal	relation	to	fail?	First,	one	could	think	of	a	world	in	which	scientists	could	ignore	even	well-advertised	skewed	science.		For	example,	that	could	possibly	be	the	case	in	a	world	in	which	production	of	scientific	research	would	not	depend	on	getting	public	founding,	or	in	a	world	in	which	the	public	is	generally	knowledgeable	about	(the	philosophy	of)	science,	and	hence,	is	able	to	recognize	that	the	well-
																																																								7	Two	points	of	clarification	are	in	order.	First,	Woodward	convincingly	argues	that	the	extent	to	which	a	cause	is	stable	is	related,	but	not	equivalent	to,	its	distal/proximate	character	vis	à	vis	the	effect.		Second,	Woodward	also	argues	that	stability	is	not	dependent	on	the	level	of	explanation:	degrees	of	stability	are	not	necessarily	to	how	“reductive”	the	explanation	is.		So,	our	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	is	not	trivial	in	the	sense	that	the	most	stable	difference-makers	would	always	be	the	most	proximate	causes	described	at	the	level	of	fundamental	particles.		
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advertised	science	is	skewed.		Arguably,	these	do	not	qualify	as	small	changes	in	the	background	conditions	for	scientific	practice.8			The	second	point	is	a	clarification	of	the	role	played	by	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	a	stable	difference-maker	for	the	production	of	EDD.		This	is	because	there	is	a	large	range	of	conditions	under	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	result	in	EDD.		These	include	the	conditions	for	all	the	cases	in	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	no	result	in	skewed	science.		If	we	take	seriously	recent	work	on	science	and	value,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	is	actually	the	rule,	not	the	exception	within	the	practice	of	science	(Douglas	2009,	Intemann	2001,	2015,	and	references	therein).		Note	that,	if	our	take	on	Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	analyses	is	correct,	then	the	claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	a	stable	difference-maker	but	only	a	contingent	enabling	factor	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	it	has	been	“physically	necessary”	in	many	of	the	well-known	instances	of	EDD.		One	can	consistently	say	that,	while	not	a	stable	difference-maker,	it	has	been	an	important	enabling	factor	for	the	production	of	well-publicized	skewed	science.		Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	has	been	necessary	for	some	groups	to	develop	an	interest	in	funding	the	production	and	public	dissemination	of	skewed	research.																																																										8	There	is	also	a	possibility	that	some	cases	of	EDD	could	come	out	of	seemingly	proper	science	“distracting”	the	public	from	the	most	widely	held	views	within	the	scientific	community.		We	believe	that	even	in	these	cases,	dissenting	views	do	not	entail	EDD	unless	there	is	violation	of	some	conventional	standards	for	proper	science.		This	interesting	issue	belongs	to	another	paper.		
	 14	
That	said	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	factors	that	are	characterized	by	this	kind	of	‘necessity’	(the	bridge	or	letter	kind	of	necessity)	and	factors	that	are	true	stable	difference-makers.		It	is	all	the	more	important	that,	if	one	of	our	goals	is	to	alter	the	production	of	EDD,	then	our	analysis	suggests	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	the	proper	target.		Once	again,	non-epistemic	values	are	the	common	rule	within	the	practice	of	science.		A	more	efficient	approach	in	the	prevention	of	EDD	would	be	to	understand	the	various	ways	skewed	science	may	be	produced.		This	includes	the	important	discussion	on	the	distinction	between	legitimate	and	illegitimate	use	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	(Hicks	2014,	Intemann	2015).		This	in	turn	includes	an	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	by	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	does	result	in	skewed	science.		Implicit	bias	might	one	of	these	mechanisms.		Inductive	risk	bias,	as	we	shall	explain	in	the	next	section,	is	another	one.		Before	we	turn	to	this	point,	let	us	take	stock.		We	have	clarified	the	causal	landscape	for	the	production	of	EDD.		We	have	identified	two	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science	and	its	effective	public	dissemination;	and	we	have	characterized	the	important	role	of	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	within	science	as	contingent	enabling	factors	for	the	production	and	dissemination	of	skewed	research,	hence	for	EDD.			
Section	4.	Consequences	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	Biddle	and	Leuschner	have	articulated	what	they	call	the	“inductive	risk	account”	of	EDD	(2015).		According	to	this	account,	the	following	set	of	conditions	are	jointly	sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD	(2015,	273):		
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Dissent	from	a	hypothesis	H	is	epistemically	detrimental	if	each	of	the	following	
obtains:	
(1) The	non-epistemic	consequences	of	wrongly	rejecting	H	are	likely	to	be	severe	
(2) The	dissenting	research	that	constitutes	the	objection	violates	established	
conventional	standards.		
(3) The	dissenting	research	involves	intolerance	for	producer	risks	at	the	expense	
of	public	risks.		
(4) Producer	risks	and	public	risks	fall	largely	upon	different	parties.		Biddle	and	Leushner	admit	that	these	conditions	are	not	necessarily	related	to	the	production	of	EDD	(275):	“We	are	not	arguing	that,	in	all	possible	worlds,	research	that	meets	the	conditions	of	the	inductive	risk	account	inhibits	the	progress	of	science.	It	is	possible,	for	example,	to	organize	science	and	to	regulate	industry	in	such	a	way	that	dissent	that	meets	these	conditions	is	not	widely	disseminated,	does	not	acquire	political	authority,	and	is	not	used	to	attack	mainstream	scientists.		But	this	is	not	the	way	in	which	science	and	society	are	currently	organized.		Dissent	that	meets	the	conditions	of	the	inductive	risk	account	is,	given	current	societal	arrangements,	likely	to	inhibit	knowledge	production,	particularly	because	of	the	success	of	political,	economic,	and	ideological	interests	in	structuring	the	dissemination	of	research.”	We	think	that	the	framework	used	in	Section	3	can	help	clarify	the	causal	landscape	for	the	production	of	EDD	offered	in	the	Inductive	Risk	Account.		Our	contention	is	that	Biddle	and	Leuschner,	by	focusing	on	inductive	risk,	have	identified	a	
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particular,	important,	but	still	contingent,	enabling	factor,	but	have	failed	to	clearly	distinguish	the	proper	core	of	stable	difference-makers,	for	the	production	of	EDD.		Let	us	make	that	point	in	more	details.		The	four	conditions	above	can	be	seen	as	dividing	into	three	groups.		Condition	(2)	identifies	one	of	the	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science.		Conditions	(1)	and	(4)	together	specify	some	particular	enabling	conditions	for	the	formation	of	non-epistemic	agendas	–	the	presence	of	severe	and	opposing	non-epistemic	consequences	(SONEC).		Condition	(3)	identifies	a	mechanism	by	which	intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	may	enable	the	production	of	skewed	science.		In	other	words,	the	inductive	risk	account	of	EDD	identifies	an	important	series	of	enabling	causes	leading	to	one	of	the	two	stable	difference-makers	we	have	identified	in	Section	1-3,	i.e.	production	of	skewed	science.		That	series	of	cause	is	something	like	this:	from	the	presence	of	SONEC	to	biased	inductive	risk	reasoning,	and	to	skewed	science.		This	is	an	important	contribution	to	the	understanding	of	EDD	precisely	because	it	not	only	identifies	some	particular	enabling	factors	(the	presence	of	SONEC)	for	the	formation	of	epistemic	agendas,	but	also	a	mechanism	by	which	intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	may	enable	the	production	of	skewed	science	(via	inductive	risk	bias).		Now	it	is	also	important	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	and	recognize	that	fulfillment	of	Condition	(2)	is	the	stable	difference-maker	which	fulfillment	of	Conditions	(1),	(4),	and	then	(3)	enable	as	a	matter	of	contingent	fact.		Biddle	and	Leuschner	seem	to	have	missed	that	useful	distinction.		
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If	our	analysis	in	Section	3	is	correct,	they	also	have	failed	to	include	the	second	stable	difference-maker	for	EDD,	i.e.	effective	public	dissemination.		As	they	admit	in	the	paper	(see	quote	above),	the	presence	of	SONEC	obviously	does	not	imply	that	effective	public	dissemination	will	ensue.		Conversely,	as	Jack’s	case	shows,	effective	public	dissemination	could	well	be	obtained	without	the	presence	of	SONEC.		How	(un-)likely	this	is	obviously	is	an	empirical	question.		No	matter	how	unlikely,	however,	it	is	important	for	our	understanding	of	EDD	to	mention	effective	public	dissemination	as	a	core	stable	difference-maker.		The	inductive	risk	account	fails	to	do	so.		Let	us	underscore,	however,	that	Biddle	and	Leuschner	once	again	have	identified	an	important	mechanism	by	which	presence	of	SONEC	enables	effective	public	dissemination	and	the	manufacturing	of	controversy:	the	presence	of	SONEC	not	only	enables	the	production	of	skewed	science,	but	also	the	establishment	of	“sophisticated,	private-funded	network	for	disseminating	[dissenting]	results”	(2015,	275).		This	brings	us	to	our	conclusion	on	the	Inductive	Risk	Account:	Biddle	and	Leuschner	have	successfully	identified	an	important	contingent	enabling	factor	for	EDD,	i.e.	the	presence	and	influence	of	SONEC.		That	said,	they	have	failed	to	distinguish	between	the	different	roles	that	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	play	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	hope	to	have	clarified	the	situation.			
Conclusion		Well-known	cases	of	EDD	seem	to	have	in	common	various	forms	of	intrusion	of	non-epistemic,	often	SONEC-related,	agendas	within	the	science.		We	have	argued	
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that	such	intrusion	is	not	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient,	it	is	also	not	a	stable	difference-maker.		We	have	clarified	its	causal	role:	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	a	contingent	enabling	factor.		Reduced	to	its	core,	EDD	is	just	well-advertised	bad	science.	Because	it	is	well	advertised,	it	has	an	impact	on	the	collective	building	of	scientific	knowledge.		Because	it	is	bad	science,	it	does	not	advance	that	endeavor,	but	any	case	negatively	impacts	it	instead.	To	make	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	is	important	for	at	least	three	reasons.		First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	that	leads	to	the	production	of	EDD,	as	it	simply	increases	our	understanding	of	EDD.		Second,	it	might	suggest	more	efficient	avenues	for	targeting	change.		Finally,	it	is	crucial	to	make	room	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	within	the	science	without	it	being	epistemologically	detrimental.		As	the	community	of	philosophers	of	science	comes	to	recognize	that	such	intrusion	is	the	rule	rather	than	the	exception,	one	must	leave	conceptual	room	for	a	distinction	between	“legitimate”	and	“illegitimate”	role	for	non-epistemic	values	within	science	(Hick	2014,	Intemann	2015).			
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